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Abstract: In this chapter I present the thesis of Proper Embodiment: the claim that (at least 
some of) the details of our physiology matter to cognition and consciousness in a funda-
mental way. This thesis is composed of two sub-claims: (1) if we are to design, build, or 
evolve artificial systems that are cognitive in the way that we are, these systems will have 
to be internally embodied, and (2) the exploitation of the particular internal embodiment 
that allows systems to evolve solutions with greatly decreased computational complex-
ity – and thus to be flexible and adaptive in the ways that are characteristic of cognitive 
systems – means that the orthodox distinction between algorithm and implementation is 
undermined. Evolved cognitive systems are therefore likely not to instantiate the distinc-
tion between phenomenology, algorithm, and implementation. The leaky levels evident in 
evolved cognitive systems motivate an extension of orthodox embodied cognitive science 
to the internal, affective, “gooey” realm that has so far only been embraced by those in the 
enactive tradition. This suggests that if we are to build artificial systems that will be genu-
inely cognitive they will have to incorporate parts of the gooey realm currently considered 
to be “mere implementation.”
1. Orthodox Embodied Cognitive Science
While there are many conceptions of embodiment that are relevant to philosophy 
of mind and cognitive science (see for example, Clark 1999; Wilson 2002; Ander-
son 2003; Ziemke 2003; Shapiro 2007) a broad overarching characterization used 
both by philosophers and those in the other cognitive sciences, including but not 
limited to robotics, is that our problem solving abilities are much less a matter 
of internal processing of information that comes into the system than orthodox 
cognitive science used to assume. Susan Hurley characterized the way of thinking 
about how minds work in the pre-embodiment revolution era as “the classical 
sandwich” (Hurley 1998): the thing that is doing the important work – the think-
ing or cognizing – is sandwiched between perception, bringing the information in, 
and acting according to the results of the information processing. On this model, 
the body is there to do the sensing and acting. Other than this the non-neural 
body is there just to keep the parts of the brain that these cognitive processes 
supervene on / are identical with (depending on your philosophical take) alive. 
Embodied cognitive science rejected this picture arguing that cognition cannot 
be cleanly separated from perception and action, and that many of our problem 
solving abilities are more a matter of adjusting the system itself, phylogenetically, 
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ontogenetically, or in occurrent action, such that the information processing that 
we would assume to be required if we were to set about programming these abil-
ities into artificial systems, is actually “offloaded” onto the system’s morphology.
While the term “offloading” in this respect is useful to see the difference from 
the pre-embodiment approach it is somewhat misleading because it implies that 
the standard case is that computations are done by the brain, but that they can 
be done by other structures instead. It rather seems to be the opposite. For many 
abilities the standard case is that we utilize the morphology of the body, the pos-
sibilities for action that it gives to us, and other structures in the environment so 
that we never have to do it all in our head (see Clark 1997, 2008b, [2001] 2013) – 
indeed most of us could not even do the calculating required for most of the 
things we do purely in our head. The result of taking embodiment seriously in 
robotics, is that when designing artificial cognitive systems, instead of deciding 
what function was to be implemented and then designing a program to imple-
ment it in a particular robot body (a top-down approach) one could rather con-
sider what kinds of creatures achieve these tasks, consider how their bodies allow 
them to do it, emulate parts of that embodiment in the artificial system, and then 
program minimally to enable the system to engage in the bodily behavior (a bot-
tom-up approach) (see Pfeifer and Bongard 2006, for a detailed examination of 
these principles at work in artificial cognitive systems and robotics).
The lesson for philosophy of mind should be clear from considering this case: 
the mind is both simpler and more complex than we previously imagined. On 
the one hand, we do not do as much of the information crunching that – on the 
orthodox approach – we assumed we must to support the ways that we perceive, 
think, and act. On the other hand, parts of what we had categorized as the mental 
when we assumed that minds were / supervened on neural information process-
ing, seem now to be located in places that we are not intuitively comfortable in 
thinking of providing the supervenience / realizing base for mindedness (Clark 
1997, 2008b; Clark and Chalmers 1998).
The choice is then to say that those are not parts of cognitive processes after 
all (the real cognition goes on in the head) in which case one needs to come up 
with a “mark of the mental” to distinguish real cognitive processes from pro-
cesses that play a merely causal (rather than constitutive) role in cognitive pro-
cessing (Adams and Aizawa 2008). Or, to bite the bullet and acknowledge that 
if we accept functionalism as the orthodox approach did, not only is mind not 
identical with the brain, but it is also perfectly consistent that mind is realized 
not merely by the brain. Andy Clark expresses this view in terms of what he calls 
the Larger Mechanism Story (LMS) as follows:
Aspects of body and world can, at times, be proper parts of larger mechanisms whose 
states and overall operating profile determine (or minimally, help determine) our men-
tal states and properties. (Clark 2008a, 39)
Functionalism about the mind of course implies multiple realizability, which 
entails that, provided that there are other materials which can implement the 
necessary processes, the functions that give rise to mind need not be limited to 
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1 I previously termed this “traditional embodied cognitive science” (Stapleton 2013).
2 I use the term ‘radical embodiment’ here following Clark’s (1999) distinction between 
simple and radical embodiment. Enactivism is therefore one (but not the only) version of radical 
embodiment.
our biological brains. This means that not only might artificial brains be created, 
but that there is no principled reason for confining minded processes to brain 
processes (biological or artificial). Thus, work on embodied (and extended) cog-
nition that comes through this tradition is – in principle – entailed by the func-
tionalism that orthodox cognitive science also assumed (see Wheeler 2010). I 
therefore refer to this approach to embodied cognition (of which Andy Clark 
[e. g., Clark 1997, 2008b] is a paradigm propagator) as “orthodox embodied cog-
nitive science.”1
Hence, while it might seem at first surprising that orthodox embodied cog-
nitive science says very little about the role of the physiological – and homeo-
static – body in cognition we can see that this is because (1) orthodox assump-
tions about cognition held that minded processes supervened in some way on 
brain processes, and (2) functionalism entailed that not only could the brain pro-
cesses that it was assumed that minded processes supervene on be multiply real-
ized in different implementations but could also be partially realized by other 
structures of the brain in the human case (hence “offloading”). The very term 
“extended” (in addition to “offloading”) indicates that this kind of embodiment 
is still working within the orthodox “brainbound” tradition (see Clark 2008b) – 
but extending it outwards by following the implications of functionalism to their 
logical conclusion.
We can therefore see why even though fans of orthodox embodied cognition 
recognize that the body is important to cognition and mindedness, they are 
never theless loathe to think that physiological processes in the body proper make 
a contribution other than a causal or modulatory one to cognition. Any contri-
bution that they do think is made e. g., by emotions, is made in virtue of those 
processes being represented in the brain. So while extended emotions fit in to this 
orthodox embodiment picture, this is not in virtue of the bodily contribution to 
cognition but rather once again following the implications of functionalism for 
the brainbound world view: i. e., taking emotions as represented in the brain as 
the standard case, and then showing that the processes we assumed were done in 
the brain are actually done (or can actually be partially done) through e. g., body 
posture, gesture, interpersonal engagement, or coupling with or structuring the 
environment in certain ways.
Let us then assume the basic tenet of orthodox embodiment: that cognition is 
not (at least not always) brainbound. Is there any more philosophical work to be 
done by asking the following question: if we are to build an artificial system that 
is genuinely cognitive, will implementing all of the processes that LMS throws 
light upon, be enough?
My hypothesis is that it will not be enough. This position, in and of itself, 
is not original; it is the position taken by many in the radical embodied2 and 
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enactive camps (see in particular Cosmelli and Thompson 2010; Thompson and 
Cosmelli 2011, which my project is heavily influenced by). However, these posi-
tions often put themselves, or are put, at odds with the orthodox embodiment 
approach because they build on assumptions which are not shared by all camps, 
e. g., the rejection of the representational / computational theory of mind, or 
the premise that a particular kind of self-organizing and self-creating organiza-
tion underpins the development of cognition in key ways (see Thompson 2007; 
Di Paolo 2005, 2009; Di Paolo and Thompson 2014). These approaches may be 
thought of as biological rather than computational for a number of reasons but at 
the very least because they take as their standard case biologically cognitive crea-
tures and seek to extrapolate from there to what is required for cognition, rather 
than taking the standard case to be the analogy of the mind to the computer.
I am sympathetic to both camps (though my publication history reveals 
that my intuitions mesh rather more with those of the biologically inspired 
approaches). Of course, as each side holds assumptions that contradict those 
of the other, one cannot be a full member of both camps at the same time (see 
Thompson and Stapleton 2009, for a discussion of why enactivism is not the 
same as externalism). What I then want to do is to take the spirit (rather than 
the details) of both camps and consider what insights it gives us. How can we do 
this, when orthodox embodied cognitive science is built upon functionalism, and 
enactive approaches reject functionalism about the mind?
I suggest that the spirit of orthodox embodiment is expressed by Clark (2008a) 
in LMS. Although this is a functionalist principle it is minimally functionalist: it 
does not entail a representational or computational view of the mind, it merely 
points to a mechanistic supervenience / realizing base for the mind. That this kind 
of mechanistic approach to the mind is still a kind of functionalism can be seen 
in Clark’s work on “microfunctionalism” where he argues that functionalism 
does not need to be identified with high level formal descriptions such as beliefs 
and desires, rather what is essential to functionalism is that the “structure not the 
stuff counts” (Clark 1989, 31).
That cognitive creatures are mechanistic in this minimal sense is generally 
accepted in cognitive science – by both the orthodox and the radical. Where 
sides differ is in answering the question of what the minimal set of mechanisms 
is that enables / realizes cognition i. e., which are the ones we need to implement 
in order to build a cognitive system. The orthodox embodiment story clearly 
pushes the boundaries of the Marrian algorithmic level towards – and into – the 
implementational level for morphological features (Clark 2013). Yet, as explained 
above in virtue of its roots in the orthodox (brainbound) tradition, this minimal 
base does not include the internal goings-on in the physiological body. The intu-
ition behind this is presumably that anything that is important that goes on in 
the physiological body is represented in the brain and so a functionalization of 
the relevant processes in the brain will include any relevant information from the 
body proper.
This is where I argue that the orthodox embodiment story errs. Let us talk 
in the mechanistic terms that are accepted by both them and the radicals, and 
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3 The work presented here is a “big picture” view of the project developed in detail in my 
doctoral thesis (Stapleton 2012) situating this in respect to traditional and radical embodied 
cognitive science.
argue that the minimal realizing system is not quite big enough yet: That it must 
include at least some mechanisms that go on in the biological body (both the 
non-neural body and parts of the neural body that are typically functionalized 
out) as proposed by Cosmelli and Thompson (2010) and Thompson and Cos-
melli (2011) with their thesis of “dynamic entanglement” (see also Clark 2013, 
for a discussion of dynamic entanglement from the orthodox embodied perspec-
tive).
Here I outline a story3 which I propose should be accepted by both orthodox 
and radical embodimenters. While those in the enactive traditions will not think 
the story presented here complete as a minimal base for cognition, they should 
accept that it is at least part of what they consider the minimal mechanistic base 
and not reject it as externalist rather than embodied (Thompson and Stapleton 
2009). And, because the story does not rest upon the assumptions of the radical 
approaches that orthodox embodiment rejects, and because it is presented as an 
extension of the mechanistic story and the fluidity of the algorithmic / implemen-
tational distinction that lies at the heart of the orthodox embodiment approach, 
without contradicting any of its own assumptions, orthodox embodimenters 
should also accept this story.
2. Introducing Proper Embodiment
The thesis of “Proper Embodiment” presented here is that (at least some of) the 
details of our physiology matter to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental 
way such that (at least some of) the mechanisms of cognition are so fine-grained 
that specifying the algorithm for cognition would entail specifying parts of the 
internal body normally considered to be background or enabling conditions for 
cognition.
I argue for this thesis through two independent theses: internal embodiment 
and particular embodiment. “Internal embodiment” is the thesis that the internal 
“gooey” body matters to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental way. 
“Particular embodiment” is the thesis that the particular details of our imple-
mentation matter to cognition. Taken together, these generate what I think is a 
compelling case that cognition is not merely embodied in the sense of orthodox 
embodied cognitive science, but Properly Embodied.
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4 I use this term in the (non-philosophically loaded) minimal sense understood in neuro-
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3. Internal Embodiment
Internal embodiment: the internal “gooey” body matters  
to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental way
In arguing for internal embodiment I focus on the role that interoception, the 
sense of the internal body, plays in cognition and consciousness. The term 
‘interoception’ was originally used by Sherrington (1948) to refer to the sense of 
the visceral body (e. g., afferent information from smooth muscles and exocrine 
glands). A. D. Craig has since argued that due to sharing a common pathway 
through the spinal cord and processing areas in the brain, pain, temperature, and 
light touch should also come under the category of interoceptive senses and so 
“interoception should be redefined as the sense of the physiological condition of 
the entire body not just the viscera” (Craig 2002, 655). This sense of the phys-
iological condition of the body gives a broad sense of how the body is faring. 
Although much of this information does not necessarily make it to conscious 
awareness, indeed Craig proposes that it is only in primates that this information 
is represented4 in the right anterior insula, which is correlated with the sense of 
subjective feelings and emotions, it is nevertheless typically co-activated with the 
limbic motor cortex and so may underpin the motivational and valenced aspect 
of affective feelings as distinct from mere feelings of sensations. Interoception is 
therefore plausibly the basis for at least a minimal sense of value and thus intrin-
sic motivation, key parts of the cognitive apparatus that are underspecified by the 
orthodox embodiment paradigm but which a properly embodied story should 
give us an account of.
Furthermore, recent work in affective neuroscience and predictive coding 
gives us reason to think that this interoceptive information may be involved 
in perceptual phenomenology. One such model, proposed by Barrett and Bar 
(2009) argues that when we perceive an object the brain makes a quick initial 
prediction about that object providing the gist of the situation but this does not 
yet correspond to our perception of the world. Rather, given this gist, the brain 
is left to predict the details of the situation based on previous knowledge, where 
“knowledge” is cashed out in terms of sensory-motor patterns that involve inter-
nal sensations including autonomic and endocrine information. On this model 
these predictions, and the filling out of the predictions, are recurrent and con-
tinue until the predictions at macro- and micro-levels no longer generate error 
signals when they are compared to incoming information. Information about 
internal bodily changes feeds in throughout this recurrency embedding affec-
tivity into perception right from low level vision and including into the dorsal 
“where” visual stream.
This model may initially seem unintuitive, influenced as we are by the Mar-
rian framework of visual processing upon which, if affect plays any role it comes 
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in as an addition to fully formed perceptual contents. But consider an intuition 
pump from William James:
Conceive yourself, if possible, suddenly stripped of all the emotion with which your 
world now inspires you, and try to imagine it as it exists, purely by itself, without 
your favourable or unfavourable, hopeful or apprehensive comment. It will be almost 
impossible for you to realize such a condition of negativity and deadness. No one por-
tion of the universe would then have importance beyond another; and the whole collec-
tion of things and series of its events would be without significance, character, expres-
sion, or perspective. Whatever of value, interest, or meaning our respective worlds may 
appear embued with are thus pure gifts of the spectator’s mind. (James 1902, 150)
While James appeals to emotions here, for him emotions are perceptions of 
bodily feelings, and so by definition available to conscious awareness, Barrett 
and Bar’s model proposes that affect is playing an even more fundamental role in 
perception which they call “unconscious affect.” They argue that:
“Unconscious affect” (as it is called) is why a drink tastes delicious or is unappetizing 
. . . why we experience some people as nice and others as mean . . . and why some paint-
ings are beautiful while others are ugly. (Barrett and Bar 2009, 1328)
This idea of “unconscious” contributions to experience that nevertheless shape 
the phenomenality of our experience is not unprecedented in philosophy. The 
phenomenological tradition has given us the concepts of pre-reflective and 
pre-intentional experience which gives all experience its characteristic ‘colour’ 
(see e. g., Ratcliffe 2010) but also contributes to the very structure of cognition. 
Ratcliffe (2005) for example draws on the phenomenological tradition to pro-
pose a reading of James’ emotion theory that goes beyond emotions structuring 
our perceptual phenomenology to their being constituents of cognition. Under-
standing intentionality in the traditional phenomenological sense, as not merely 
the “aboutness” of a mental state but rather “conceptualized in practical terms, 
as an orientation that does not merely reveal but also differently configures the 
experienced world” (Ratcliffe 2005, 192) allows us to understand James as argu-
ing that emotions / feelings are not only perceptions of bodily feelings but rather 
are constituted by / through both the perception of these bodily feelings and the 
feelings themselves.
While at first glance there might seem to be a tension here between on the 
one hand a part of an objective environment being revealed to one in virtue of 
one’s senses and, on the other hand, one’s world being a subjective construct, 
this tension is illusory. The claim is that there is an external world but we have 
access to only the parts of that world that are made available to us through our 
senses. What the phenomenological approach brings out – that the more biolog-
ical approach may leave implicit – is that the senses do not make parts of that 
world available to us “as is” but rather the world is translated through our partic-
ular sensory mechanisms and possibilities for interaction such that experience is 
structured by these in a way we cannot eliminate. Thus, given that affect is inti-
mately bound with our sensory capacities, it also shapes how we experience the 
world – “our world,” and how we can act in that world. And, it is this claim that 
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plicates the tight “entanglement” of the neurophysiological details, see Cosmelli and Thompson 
(2010); Thompson and Cosmelli (2011).
if affect shapes how we experience the world then it also shapes how we can act 
in that world, that I take to be the heart of Ratcliffe’s Jamesian / phenomenological 
claim that affect is constitutive of cognition. I have argued elsewhere in detail that 
drawing on the biological details of the interoceptive underpinnings of affectivity 
can give us good reason to think of affect as constitutive of cognition also in a 
non-phenomenological sense (Stapleton 2012). For the purposes of this chapter 
however the work outlined so far should be enough to motivate the plausibility of 
the weaker claim that in natural cognitive systems like ourselves, having an inter-
nal body shapes consciousness and cognition even when the interoceptive / affec-
tive information is unconscious / pre-reflective. And, because the information that 
feeds into cognition and consciousness is imbued with a natural value, in terms of 
value to the physiological system, to create an artificial system that is genuinely 
cognitive – and therefore has its own intrinsic values as a basis for motivation – 
we may need to implement some kind of functionally equivalent “internal body.”
Internal embodiment – that the internal “gooey” body matters to cognition and 
consciousness in a fundamental way – on its own does not require a modification 
of Clark’s LMS so much as it is an extension of it inwards. It contributes to the 
story something that was lacking in the standard functionalist framework: value 
and motivation, and begins to reintegrate the phenomenological with the func-
tional to more properly address our actual explanandum in cognitive science: nat-
ural cognitive systems. Does Internal Embodiment on its own however actually 
require an internal body, even a functionalized version of one? It is not imme-
diately obvious that the functions that the internal body plays in contributing 
to value and consciousness couldn’t be implemented in the brain (or externally). 
After all, the orthodox embodimenter would argue, even in the biological case, 
the real contribution that they give to cognition and consciousness is in virtue of 
their representations in the brain. If this is the case, then it is not that the gooey 
body matters to cognition and consciousness in a fundamental way but rather 
that our gooey bodies implement functions that matter to cognition and con-
sciousness in a fundamental way. While this may be an important addition to the 
orthodox embodiment story, it is nevertheless a trivial kind of internal embodi-
ment, because the internality is not what is playing the key functional role.
Do we have reason for thinking that the internal, gooey body that has evolved 
as part of us, has a fundamentally more important role than a mere functional 
one at this Larger Mechanistic level? Or, to phrase this in different terms, are 
our physiological processes a mere happenstance of our evolution the essential 
functions of which can be happily implemented in a variety of materials and 
locations? I propose that this is not the case. Rather, natural cognitive systems are 
not only internally embodied but also embodied in a particular way that means 
large mechanistic functionalization of these processes just may not suffice5. This 
is the thesis of particular embodiment.
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Maturana, and Uribe 1974; Maturana and Varela 1980; Thompson 2007; for an accessible in-
troduction, see Di Paolo and Thompson 2014). However, here I am concerned with putting 
forward a position that does not require a commitment to grounding cognition in autopoietic 
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4. Particular Embodiment
Particular Embodiment: the particular details  
of our implementation matter to cognition
Orthodox embodied cognitive science rests upon a version of functionalism that 
is expressed by Clark’s LMS discussed above (see Wheeler 2010). Like most ver-
sions of functionalism this abstracts from the details of implementation because, 
as Clark puts it, the “structure not the stuff counts” (Clark 1989, 31). Any mech-
anistic view of the mind will of course endorse the principle that it is the struc-
ture and not the stuff that counts when it comes to bringing about cognitive 
processes. That there really is a distinction between structure and stuff, however, 
may not be as obvious as it first appears.6
The thesis of particular embodiment is that the particular details of our imple-
mentation matter to cognition and hence any functionalization of the substruc-
ture of cognition would need to be at a fineness of grain that functionalizes these 
details. In order to motivate this thesis I will here put forward two “proofs of 
concept” drawn from evolutionary robotics: GasNets and evolved hardware.
5. GasNets
The principle behind evolutionary robotics is that, by emulating variation, heri-
tability and natural selection one can artificially “evolve” robotic (or simulated) 
agents with complex behavior, gaining the standard advantages of neural nets, 
such as graceful degradation, as well as the targeted behavioral outcomes nor-
mally achieved through traditional programming. This is done by hooking up 
a group of neural networks to a task environment, or a simulation thereof, and 
selecting the most successful ones based on whatever fitness function you are 
using (i. e., those that are most successful – or least bad – at the task assigned). In 
order to increase variation of “genes” a few of those who were not most success-
ful, but close by, are added and this group allowed to multiply while the rest are 
culled and recombinations of these “genotypes” and mutations are introduced. 
These steps are then repeated over and over, through many generations until net-
works evolve that can solve the task (the amount of generations needed to evolve 
a successful solution means that simulations are more practical than evolving 
networks using physical robotic agents at each stage).
It has been known for some time that communication in the brain is not only 
mediated by electrical and chemical signaling but also gasotransmission, such 
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as through gases like nitric oxide (NO), carbon monoxide (CO), and hydrogen 
sulfide (H2S). The assumption has always been, I take it, that in natural cognitive 
systems our implementation is gooey and complex as a result of our evolution 
but that this messy natural “design” could be abstracted away from and func-
tionalized, and perhaps even improved upon. In short, there has reigned a culture 
of “electrical chauvinism” where it has been assumed that all of the important 
properties of cognition are represented at this level and molecular signaling and 
other gooey implementation can be factored out.
Smith and colleagues (2002) set up an experiment to compare the evolvability 
and adaptivity of solutions in standard artificial neural network models designed 
to model electrical transmission between nodes (NoGas) and an adaptation of 
the standard artificial neural network that was designed to also model gasotrans-
mission (GasNet). The difference between the NoGas and the GasNet is that 
in the GasNet activations of nodes are not only a function of the inputs of the 
connected nodes (as with standard neural networks) but is also a function of the 
concentration of gas at that node.
The task that Smith and colleagues set was for robotic agents starting from an 
arbitrary position in a black-walled arena to find and navigate towards a white 
triangle while avoiding a white square. They show that basing their evolution 
of solutions on the GasNet class consistently produced successful solutions in 
fewer generations than evolution of solutions on the NoGas class. They argue 
that the GasNet solutions seem to be more evolvable because they are more 
amenable to being tuned to the particular characteristics of the environment, 
which is to say that the solutions are more flexibly adaptive. This adaptivity 
seems to arise from particular features of the gas diffusion mechanism which 
enable functions to be based on input patterns over time, which in turn allows 
noisy input to be filtered out.
This example from evolutionary robotics shows that a particular (gooey) fea-
ture of our embodiment plays a key role in evolvability leading to populations 
that can quickly adapt to a learning task and a particular environment. This is 
interesting in and of itself, but what is of particular relevance to us here is that 
both the GasNet and the NoGas controllers evolved functionally equivalent 
timing mechanisms. And yet, despite the functional equivalence in terms of the 
success criterion – the particular implementations resulted in a quite different 
amenability to being tuned to a particular environment. The moral for us to take 
from GasNets is that just because both GasNet and NoGas are successful solu-
tions to the environment that they have evolved for (once they have evolved 
and reached 100 % fitness) and are therefore functionally equivalent in regard to 
the success criterion, this does not mean that the level of explanation at which 
we see the functional equivalence is the correct one to understand what is really 
key to the ability of each controller to succeed. That is to say what is key to a 
controller’s being flexible and adaptive – the qualities that we are interested in 
if natural cognition is our explanandum – is not the same as what is key to the 
mere successful implementation of a function. By looking at the ease of evolv-
ability and the mechanisms which underpin this amenability to being tuned to a 
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particular environment we can see that the relevant level of explanation for the 
adaptive behavior of the controllers is that which specifies the interaction of the 
gas and the nodes. The key point is this: In evolved systems this is not just the 
implementation, but rather it is the relevant level for the algorithm of an adaptive 
system. This is relevant not only over evolutionary timescales but, as Philip-
pedes and colleagues (2005) note, also at the time scale of the (neurally plastic) 
changes themselves so that the biology of gas diffusion in real brains, and their 
subsequent modelling of GasNets parallels the embodied cognition approach to 
cognitive science, but internally. They state:
In highlighting the functional importance of brain morphology, these phenomena take 
us increasingly further away from connectionist ideas and suggest that Pfeifer’s notion 
of ecological balance, which requires a harmonious relationship between an agents’ 
morphology, materials and control, can perhaps be taken inside the head. (Philippedes 
et al. 2005, 145)
This suggests that when it comes to cognition that functional equivalence may 
have to be at a much lower level than that specified by the LMS (and other func-
tionalist approaches).7
6. Evolved Hardware
A second line of evidence for the thesis of particular embodiment also comes 
from one of the authors of the GasNet study: Adrian Thompson. While typically 
in evolutionary robotics algorithms are evolved in simulation and then transferred 
to hardware, this study used evolutionary algorithms to configure the switches on 
a Field-Programmable Gate Array evaluating the circuit based on its performance 
in the real-world (Thompson 1997). The aim of the experiment was to evolve a 
recurrent network of logic gates, and the Field-Programmable Gate Array is a 
digital chip which should therefore be ideally suited to this task. The surprising 
solution which evolved however was not based on logic gates. That is, the gates in 
the chip were not used to do logic. The solution that evolved exploited physical 
characteristics of the chip and behaviors that emerged. For example, a quarter of 
the cells in the array were clearly contributing to the target behavior as disabling 
them resulted in loss of the solution, but some of these cells were not even con-
nected to the main part of the circuit. This defies the standard separation of algo-
rithm and implementation. In this case the exploitation of physical characteristics 
of the chip enabled the system to evolve solutions which had greatly decreased 
computational complexity compared to traditionally designed algorithms. In this 
respect this example corroborates and strengthens the conclusions from the Gas-
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Net study. But this example from evolved hardware does even more than this: 
it gives us a real case where we can see that in evolved systems the line between 
algorithm and implementation is blurred so that it is no longer a trivial matter to 
implement an algorithm evolved on one particular piece of hardware on another 
piece of hardware in the way that functionalism assumes that one must.
7. The Case for Proper Embodiment
I have argued for two theses: internal embodiment and particular embodiment:
1. Internal embodiment: the internal “gooey” body matters to cognition and con-
sciousness in a fundamental way
2. Particular Embodiment: the particular details of our implementation matter to 
cognition
The examples I have outlined in support of the thesis of particular embodiment 
give us good reason to think that the solutions that have evolved to make us 
the flexible, adaptive, neurally plastic cognitive systems that we are, are likely a 
result of the exploitation of our particular embodiment, both over evolutionary 
and developmental time, but very plausibly also over the time scale of the plastic 
changes that underpin new learning in hour-to-hour and day-to-day contexts. 
From this perspective the clean levels inherited from orthodox cognitive science 
and which remain implicit in orthodox embodied cognitive science – algorithmic 
and implementational – are revealed to be leaky in evolved systems.
While on its own the thesis of particular embodiment could be considered a 
mere extension to orthodox embodied cognition (see for example Clark’s consid-
erations of A. Thompson’s work in Clark 2013), in combination with the thesis 
of internal embodiment it packs a much heftier punch: the internal physiological 
realm that interoception brings information from is a complex, dynamic system, 
and the lessons that we gain from the evolutionary robotics and hardware exam-
ples give us reason to think that it will not be easy to separate the algorithm of 
the relevant processes from their gooey implementation. The thesis of particular 
embodiment, while consistent with orthodox embodied cognitive science, is that 
much more radical in combination with the thesis of internal embodiment as 
together they not only suggest, as Philippedes and colleagues (2005) say, that the 
balance between morphology, materials and control can be taken inside the head, 
but that it can also be taken into the body proper.
The combination of internal embodiment and particular embodiment may 
seem to undermine orthodox embodied cognitive science because by pushing 
the leakiness of the algorithm / implementation boundary so far it is no longer 
clear whether there is a boundary at all.8 However, while these theses may well 
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that gives rise to the kinds of experiences that we then categorize according to these “cognitive” 
categories.
9 Whether or not the possibility of being instantiated in different materials implies that 
nanofunctionalism entails multiple realizability is a question for another time.
contribute to undermining orthodox embodied cognitive science in combination 
with other assumptions or arguments (as for example is done in the enactive lit-
erature), as they are presented here, they do not need to be in conflict with the 
spirit of orthodox embodiment approaches. Taking this spirit to be accurately 
expressed by the LMS, the theses presented here motivate the modification of 
this to a “Smaller Mechanism Story” or a “nanofunctionalist” explanation (Sta-
pleton 2012) where the processes that make up the substructure of cognition are 
much closer to the implementational details than traditionally envisioned. Being 
so close to the implementational details means that much of the body that was 
factored out on the orthodox approach is now going to play a role in the algo-
rithmic substructure of cognitive processes. Nevertheless, a Properly Embodied 
cognitive science is not a biologically chauvinist position; a “smaller mechanism” 
or “nanofunctionalist” story implies that these functions could in principle be 
instantiated in different materials and could therefore in principle be extended – 
or rather external elements could in principle be “incorporated” (Clark 2008b; 
Thompson and Stapleton 2009) – but this instantiation is going to be at a much 
finer grain than traditionally assumed.9 Proper Embodiment can thus be taken 
as extending orthodox embodied cognition inwardly, and thereby also extending 
the explanandum beyond abstract cognitive processes that are the target of much 
of cognitive science research back to the flexible, adaptive processes at work in 
evolved cognitive systems.
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